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By examining Martin Heidegger's critique of Søren Kierkegaard, this essay 
reconsiders the limits that an ontotheology of the subject may or may not impose 
on investigations of the relations between being and time. I begin by 
summarizing briefly both Heidegger's rejection of subject-centered thought and 
his critique of Kierkegaard as an example of such thought. I then delineate the 
sense in which, and gauge the extent to which, in The Concept of Anxiety 
Kierkegaard unsettles both the modal-ontological categories on which such 
subject-centered thought is based and the "vulgar" notion of time that, according 
to Heidegger, traditionally attends the invocation of these categories. Finally, I 
indicate briefly some ways in which Heidegger's thought remains partially 
beholden to an ontotheology of the subject. The more general implication is 
certainly not, however, that Kierkegaard outdoes Heidegger in some sort of 
competition in the deconstruction of metaphysics. Rather, this approach to the 
question of the metaphysics of the subject by way of the anxiety-analyses of 
Heidegger and Kierkegaard suggests that the exact character of such a 
metaphysics and the specific meaning of "subject" and "subjectivity" remain open 
and pressing questions, especially given that Heidegger's fundamental ontology 
(and his Seinsdenken), as well as Kierkegaard's critique of Hegelian 
systematicity, remain marked by traditional notions of sovereign self-
determination, and its ontology. 
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Since now my attempts at thinking too are often 
brought into relation to Kierkegaard, and otherwise 
the classification as "philosophy of existence" has 
become utterly self-evident and, as it were, everything 
in advance is sunken into the grave of this title, 
something must be said toward the clarification of the 
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concept of existence in Being and Time (Martin 
Heidegger).1  
 
The 'substance' of the human is not 
spirit as the synthesis of soul and body, 
but existence" (Martin Heidegger).2 
 
Amongst the various questions raised by Heidegger's appropriation of 
Kierkegaard, the one on which I focus here is the question of the limits placed by 
an ontotheology and anthropology—an ontoanthropotheology—of the "subject" 
on investigations concerning the relations between being and time. Does 
conceiving of the human as a "subject" necessarily falsify or distort the 
relationship between the human and being and/or time? Is the "subject" 
necessarily always conceived as Vorhandenheit, which is to say, as existentia  = 
Wirklichkeit in a manner that obscures its "authentic" temporality? How far does 
Kierkegaard take us—and in what ways does he block us from proceeding—
along the road to understanding how human beings exist in time, and how time 
structures human existence? In order to pursue these and related questions, I 
begin by expanding briefly on Heidegger's reasons for rejecting a philosophy of 
the subject, and then I outline his characterization of Kierkegaard as representing 
such a philosophy. This preparation enables me to consider then with reference 
to The Concept of Anxiety whether or not Kierkegaard simply remains within a 
metaphysics of subjective presence in Heidegger's sense, and whether or not his 
conception of time is simply reducible to the "vulgar" notion of time, 
Innerzeitigkeit or "within-timeness," as Heidegger argues. (I ignore the question 
and role of pseudonyms here, although I by no means dismiss their importance 
more generally for an interpretation of Kierkegaard's works, and especially of the 
"subject" in these works.) Having pursued these questions, finally, I very briefly 
consider whether or not Heidegger's own model of Dasein, including his later 
thinking of the truth of Being, entirely exceeds the metaphysics of the subject. 
This trajectory leads to the suggestion that, on the one hand, Kierkegaard goes 
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somewhat farther toward Heidegger's thought than Heidegger can or will quite 
give him credit for, and that, on the other hand, Heidegger, through the limitations 
of his own thought, remains closer to Kierkegaard than he can acknowledge. 
Such a provisional result, which attempts less to be original than to be 
reasonably judicious, is not meant to invalidate Heidegger's thought, but to help 
us in a small way to gauge, in relation to Kierkegaard and through the rereading 
of certain Kierkegaardian motifs from The Concept of Anxiety, where Heidegger 
is to be situated in his progress toward his own stated philosophical ambitions. 
More generally and importantly, it reopens the question of the subject beyond the 
limits of Heidegger's critique of Kierkegaard.  
 
I. 
Before coming to Heidegger's characterization of Kierkegaard's thought as an 
onto-anthropo-theological subjectivism that is problematically metaphysical in its 
conception of being as presence and of truth as restricted to the truth of beings, 
we need to recall what Heidegger says about the notion of the "subject" in 
general in Being and Time.3 The problem with the construal of the human being 
as a subject for Heidegger is that one always presupposes for this subject an 
ontological status of Vorhandenheit, or "(objective) presence," as Stambaugh 
translates it, and which Heidegger chooses explicitly from the outset of Sein und 
Zeit as the German terminological equivalent of existentia (42; 41). In construing 
the human being as a subject, one unwittingly treats it like a thing. (In this sense, 
traditional philosophical conceptions of the subject never treat it, as it were, 
subjectively enough.) The ontological determination of Da-sein as "je meines" 
does indeed entail an ontic self-evidence that the "who" of Da-sein is always "I"—
an ego, subject, or self, which sustains itself as identical through the changes of 
attitudes and experiences. But this implication of a present [vorhanden] 
subjektum, "lying at the base of" consciousness, is something like a 
transcendental illusion, because my Being is mine always also as my having-to-
be it, i.e. it does not ground me here and now except insofar as it awaits my 
reassumption of it there and then. My being is temporally dispersed. This is—
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very quickly stated—why the mode of presence of Vorhandenheit "is the mode of 
being [Seinsart] of beings unlike Dasein" (115; 112). Its factuality is accessible 
though a theoretical or "gazing constatation" [in einem hinsehenden Feststellen] 
(135; 132), unlike the facticity of Da-sein, which appears as thrownness in 
moods. The human is not a subject, because the being of a subject is always 
conceived as punctually self-coincident, a present moment, whereas human 
being as existence in Heidegger's sense is constituted principally by the temporal 
"ecstases." When Heidegger arrives (in § 65) at the determination of temporality 
as the meaning of care (the care that he has determined as the being of Da-
sein), the reason for his initial refusal of metaphors of subjectivity will attain a 
heightened explicitness, as the three ecstases of time—future [Zukunft], having-
been [Gewesenheit], and presencing [Gegenwärtigen]—appear as what makes 
possible [ermöglicht] (324; 310) the "articulated structural whole of care" (324; 
310). The meaning of care—which Heidegger in turn associates with Dasein 
itself in the process of its self-understanding—is precisely this temporality that 
makes care "possible" (324, 310). Temporality—and not a punctually present 
subject—is thus the "ground" of Dasein (436; 413). Having retraced very briefly 
Heidegger's argument against subjectivity, we need now to consider how 
Heidegger situates Kierkegaard with respect to this problematic of the subjective.  
 
II. 
Fourteen years after the publication of Sein und Zeit, in the first part of the 
lectures on Schelling from 1941, entitled Die Metaphysik des deutschen 
Idealismus, while the War and the Holocaust are well underway, Heidegger is 
working hard to distinguish himself not only from existentialism in general (and 
specifically in Jaspers and Kierkegaard), but also from subjectivism. He quotes at 
length and responds bitterly, for example, to Nikolai Hartmann's recent 
accusations to this effect, but that particular polemic is not our topic here. In the 
process of marking his distance from the "philosophy of existence," Heidegger 
characterizes Kierkegaard's thought of "existence" as one that identifies 
"existence" with "reality" [Wirklichsein], and yet also with "subjectivity," with 
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"consciousness," and with human individuality. For Heidegger, that is, 
Kierkegaard belongs generally to the metaphysical tradition of determining 
existentia as reality qua presence (17), but also more narrowly to the modern 
tradition that determines this reality as subjectivity.   
At the same time, however, Kierkegaard is for Heidegger precisely not a 
philosopher, and this makes Heidegger ambivalent about his work, because the 
non-convergence of a thinker with philosophy per se can be a good thing, as well 
as a bad one, from Heidegger's perspective. First, Kierkegaard is not a 
philosopher in the sense that, as a mere faithful Christian, he is as it were sub-
philosophical. For example, Heidegger suggests that Kierkegaard does not do 
justice either to Hegel or to his own debts to Hegel, and so Heidegger says that 
he "renounces philosophy utterly and exists only as a believer" [schlechthin der 
Philosophie entsagt, und nur als Gläubiger existiert] (25). But secondly, 
Kierkegaard is more than philosophical, and in this sense a thinker who cannot 
simply be assimilated into either theology or philosophy or even more broadly 
metaphysics: he is "more theological than ever a Christian theologian and more 
unphilosophical than ever a metaphysician could be" (19). And in this he is 
"incomparable. . . he must stand alone: neither theology nor philosophy can 
assimilate him to its history" [theologischer denn je ein christlicher Theologe und 
unphilosophischer als je ein Metaphysiker sein könnte. . . . unvergleichlich; er 
muß in sich stehenbleiben; weder die Theologie noch die Philosophie kann ihn in 
ihre Geschichte einreihen] (19). And of course, Heidegger himself strives to be 
beyond philosophy—he says explicitly in these lectures that Being and Time as a 
project or mode of thinking is "not yet or no longer philosophy" (28)—so in this 
context it is certainly not clear that being more unphilosophical than any 
metaphysician would be a bad thing.   
In short, on the one hand Kierkegaard belongs to the modern metaphysics 
of subjectivity to the degree that he does not manage to reconfigure or 
redetermine the concepts he inherits in a new and explicitly rigorous way that 
would question specifically being and time along the line of thinking Heidegger 
develops. Furthermore, although trying to push in some respects beyond the 
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metaphysics of subjectivity and orthodox Lutheran theology, Kierkegaard 
nonetheless, according to Heidegger, determines "existence" as "being in the 
truth of Christian faith an individual human before God.  (Being a Christian in 
reality, 'in' the real—before the absolutely real.)" (26). In other words, 
Kierkegaard adheres to a metaphysics of subjectivity that Heidegger will later call 
ontotheological, in which the presence of God as highest being confirms the 
presence of the subject-soul in its being. As he puts it in these Schelling-lectures: 
"The cosmos and the ground of the cosmos, God, theos, is a human who has 
been thought out and thought upwards [hinaus- und hinaufgedacht(...)] to the 
level of the gigantic and the unconditional" (72). A certain humanism, or 
anthropocentrism, goes hand in hand with religion as ontotheology, constituting 
an ontoanthropotheology, in this metaphysics, to which Kierkegaard still in part 
belongs.   
But on the other hand, Kierkegaard in his role both as "religious thinker" 
(19) and also as "writer" (26) becomes an unavoidable encounter and even 
perhaps an unsurpassable obstacle—an dem man nicht vorbeikommt (26)—by 
virtue of having "realized. . . a singular sojourn [einzigartigen Aufenthalt] of self-
reflection [or reflection on the self: Selbstbesinnung] within the nineteenth 
century" (26).  
 
III. 
Of the various ways in which Kierkegaard might be seen to push or gesture 
beyond a metaphysics of presence (and hence beyond the subject in 
Heidegger's sense), the one I'd like to consider here is his displacement of the 
ontology of essence and existence in his analysis of possibility in The Concept of 
Anxiety. I will argue first that he displaces possibility from its positions as the 
opposite of reality, and as the negation of impossibility. This means that he 
undermines also the decidability of the distinctions between essence and 
existence, and between essentiality and inessentiality. Secondly, I will explore 
some of the ways in which this displacement reasserts itself in Heidegger's own 
conceptualization of possibility. Heidegger's repeated claims that Kierkegaard 
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made no progress in matters of ontology or on the level of the existenzial, but 
remained limited to the ontic, or the existenziell, appear in this light to have more 
the character of interested disavowals than of dispassionately reliable 
philosophico-historical claims. 
What happens, then, to the sense of "possibility" in the process of 
Kierkegaard's mobilization of the term within his analysis of anxiety? For 
example, what happens to possibility when Kierkegaard claims that "anxiety is 
freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility" (42), and speaks of the 
"anxious possibility of being able" (44), phrases that inaugurate a philosophico-
historical chain passing by way of Heidegger's possibility of impossibility to 
Levinas's "impossibility of every possibility," or not being able to be able, only the 
first of which I will consider here?4    
It can be said that, in identifying a mood with ontological modal categories 
by way of an anthropological-metaphysical concept such as that of the freedom 
to act that characterizes the human (what Kant had called "causality of the will"), 
Kierkegaard is subjectivizing and humanizing ontology. But one can say with at 
least equal plausibility that he is ontologizing the psycho-somatic or the 
psychophysiological here. One might even say, in a more Heideggerian idiom, 
that Kierkegaard is examining the mode of being of the human—freedom's 
actuality—as a relation to being in its guise as possibility of possibility. Yet of 
course what is important is not just that Kierkegaard is dealing with modal 
categories in his definition of anxiety, but how he is doing so.    
To get started: the notion of freedom as "possibility of possibility" 
modalizes a modality, or potentiates it (to use the language of romantic reflexion-
philosophy through Schelling), such that possibility presents itself in its most 
proper (or real) form—because anxiety is the encounter with possibility in an 
emphatic sense—as something other than an actuality or reality. If the most real 
or actual form of possibility ("freedom's actuality") is its mere possibility, then—at 
least in this instance—the opposition between possibility and actuality is being 
undermined or exceeded, suspended or placed in question, precisely as it is 
being maintained. For the possibility (of possibility) is here its actuality. 
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Conversely, in the anxiety-text actuality presents itself as remaining pervaded by 
possibility, as overwhelmed by possibility—e.g. the anxiety of the good and the 
anxiety of evil arise out of the possibility that reinstalls itself with every movement 
of actualization (or every renewal of the qualitative leap into sin). And in the 
concluding section, as Kierkegaard contrasts the lightness of actuality with the 
weightiness of possibility, actuality becomes as it were more possible than 
possibility itself, and possibility becomes more actual than actuality. Finally, when 
Kierkegaard determines anxiety as the "intermediate term" in the "transition" from 
possibility to actuality (49), he situates anxiety as precisely this limit where each 
modal category turns into its opposite, or the very site of the ongoing self-
deconstruction of the opposition between possibility and actuality.5 Since this 
latter opposition is traditionally the equivalent of that between essence and 
existence, I am suggesting that Kierkegaard operates in this text also a 
deconstruction of the opposition between essence and existence.6 The 
encounter with an "infinity of possibility" (61) in anxiety is the encounter not only 
with the proliferation of essences, or significations, but also with their tendency to 
de-realize the world or to usurp its palpability, while at the same time existence or 
reality takes on the significance of the essential, for example in the sense that 
action augments its urgency.     
 Moreover, under the pressure of Kierkegaard's analysis, the notion of 
possibility appears at times difficult to distinguish from impossibility itself. In light 
of the fact that there is an abyss between possibility and actuality—an abyss that 
remains despite the tendency of the terms to become undecidable—possibility is 
radically altered through the "qualitative leap" of the act, such that even that 
subset of the possible chosen for realization never allows its realization as such 
or unaltered. This would be perhaps one implication of the "absolute future" 
David Kangas talks about in Kierkegaard's Instant.7 It is certainly one meaning of 
the "prohibition" that language utters in The Concept of Anxiety—the cloud of 
"no" resting on all of possibility, connecting us as it were in advance with the 
impossibility. The possible is impossible. 
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 Thus, although he works out a "psychological" discourse that would 
supplement a religious, "dogmatic" one, and although he retains the 
conceptuality of body and soul as realized and uplifted into a spiritual unity (and 
other basic conceptual elements of Occidental metaphysics), Kierkegaard also 
unsettles ontological categories crucial to the metaphysics of presence and of the 
subject—as the presence of realized possibility. Before coming back to the 
question of how Kierkegaard's account of temporality in the anxiety book relates 
to Heidegger's account in and around Being and Time, let us briefly consider 
some of the terms that in Heidegger correspond to the distorted or reconfigured 
modality terms we've been recalling from Kierkegaard.    
 The most obvious point, which I cannot exhaustively develop here, is that 
the emphatic notion of "possibility" passes like a kind of original postmetaphysical 
sin from Kierkegaard to Heidegger such that while Heidegger appropriates this 
notion in his own manner, he also certainly seems to be powerfully influenced by 
Kierkegaard. Indeed, one can plausibly speak of what Harold Bloom called 
"anxiety of influence" in this relationship, and precisely concerning the theory of 
anxiety itself, and its contexts. In his discussion of anxiety in Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger describes the falling prey [Verfallen] of everyday inauthenticity as 
fleeing into the world (of taking-care and concern) from something that is not in 
the world as a real presence, either vorhanden or zuhanden. This flight is based 
on anxiety before "being-in-the-world," which is radically indeterminate, a 
nothing, as in Kierkegaard, and indeed a nothing of possibilities. "What crowds in 
upon us [Was beengt] is not this or that, nor is it everything objectively present 
[alles Vorhandene] together as a sum, but the possibility of things at hand in 
general [die Möglichkeit von Zuhandenem überhaupt], that is, the world itself" 
(187; 181). And in turn anxiety is anxious about [um] being-in-the-world as an 
indefinite plurality of possibilities of being for being-there (187; 181). Anxiety 
"throws Dasein back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic potentiality-
for-being-in-the-world [sein eigentliches In-der-Welt-sein-können]. Anxiety 
individuates Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, as understanding, 
projects itself essentially upon possibilities [Die Angst vereinzelt das Dasein auf 
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sein eigenstes In-der-Welt-sein, das als verstehendes wesenhaft auf 
Möglichkeiten sich entwirft ]" (187; 181-2). Thus, along with that for which it is 
anxious, anxiety discloses Dasein as being-possible [Mit dem Worum des 
Sichängstens erschließt daher die Angst das Dasein als Möglichsein]. (187-8; 
182) Not only does anxiety, here too, turn about the encounter with possibility, 
but possibility is more than just possibility in Heidegger; as in Kierkegaard, it 
tends to absorb human existence into itself. Anxiety in Heidegger too is 
associated with radical freedom with respect to possibilities, for example as: 
"being free for. . . the authenticity of its being as possibility which it always 
already is [Freisein für. . . die Eigentlichkeit seines Seins als Möglichkeit, die es 
immer schon ist] "(188;182).8 The structure of possibility in Heidegger, whereby it 
undecidably impinges on reality, is quite similar to the structure of possibility in 
Kierkegaard.     
Indeed, Heidegger develops further and with greater explicitness the 
intimacy of the relationship between possibility and impossibility that is more 
implicit in Kierkegaard. Heidegger describes the existential-ontological structure 
of death as: "the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus, death 
reveals itself as one's ownmost, nonrelational, insuperable [unüberholbar] 
possibility" (250-1; 241). By running out ahead [Vorlaufen], or anticipating one's 
death, Dasein can recognize to a greater or lesser extent that this possibility of 
impossibility is already realizing itself, that the possible has already become 
impossible. In addition, as a possibility assumed or taken on, it has a reality of 
another sort, namely that of resoluteness. "As anticipation of possibility, being-
toward-death first makes this possibility possible and sets it free as possibility 
[Das Sein zum Tode als Vorlaufen in die Möglichkeit ermöglicht allererst diese 
Möglichkeit und macht sie als solche frei ]" (262; 251). In a manner similar to 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger intermingles and unsettles the distinct modal-conceptual 
identities of possibility and reality—as he also constantly (especially in the later 
work) mixes essence and existence when he uses Wesen and Anwesen in 
verbal forms—so as to describe and evoke the uncanniness of the relation 
between the human being and being as such in its various modal aspects.9   
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IV. 
 If Kierkegaard's displacement of the traditional opposition between 
possibility and reality or essence and existence can thus be seen to go beyond a 
subjectivist version of the metaphysics of presence as simple Vorhandenheit, 
and to play a prominent role in Heidegger's development of the motifs of being 
able to and being possible, then what about Kierkegaard's approach to time? 
Heidegger argues in Sein und Zeit that Kierkegaard remains caught up in the 
"vulgar" notion of time, "Innerzeitigkeit," which sees the human as situated at any 
given now-instant in time rather than as constituting its being through 
temporalization in the three "ecstases" of futurity, having-been-ness, and 
presentation. Let us see how this argument works, and to what extent 
Kierkegaard's account of time accords with the picture Heidegger paints of it.   
 Heidegger offers his main comments on Kierkegaard's theory of 
temporality in a brief footnote within section §68 of Sein und Zeit, where he is 
detailing the temporal structures of the three main aspects of the disclosure of 
Being in Dasein in terms of understanding [Verstehen], attunement 
[Befindlichkeit], and falling prey [Verfallen]. Let me set the scene in a formal way, 
without spelling out the meanings of all the terms that comprise the scene, in 
order to recall the context of the footnote we need to consider. While 
understanding is primarily grounded in the future [Zukunft], attunement primarily 
in having-been [Gewesenheit], and falling prey in the present [Gegenwart], each 
aspect of the disclosure of Being involves all three temporal "ecstases"  (346; 
330). It is in his treatment here of the temporal structure of understanding that 
Heidegger makes his polemical remarks against Kierkegaard. Since 
understanding, which is primarily futural, can take on authentic and inauthentic 
forms, associated with resoluteness and irresoluteness respectively, Heidegger 
distinguishes between two structures. Authentic understanding relates to the 
future by anticipation [Vorlaufen], to the present as the moment [Augenblick], and 
to the past as repetition [Wiederholung], in the sense of the return to the past that 
would reabsorb it into the space of resoluteness. Inauthentic understanding 
Konturen VII (2015) 205 
constitutes the future as "awaiting" or "expecting" [Gewärtigen], the present as 
making present [Gegenwärtigen], and the past as forgetfulness [Vergessenheit].   
Within this set-up, it is the moment, or Augenblick, that—not surprisingly—
prompts Heidegger's brief polemical footnote.   
Kierkegaard saw the existentiell phenomenon of the Moment in the 
most penetrating way, which does not mean that he was also as 
successful in the existential interpretation of it. He gets stuck in the 
vulgar concept of time and defines the Moment with the help of the 
now and eternity. When Kierkegaard speaks of "temporality," he 
means human being's being-in-time. Time as within-time-ness 
knows only the now, but never a moment. But if the moment is 
experienced existentially [existenziell], a more primordial 
temporality is presupposed, although existentially [existenzial] 
inexplicit. (338; 323)     
But how does Heidegger himself define the "moment"?  
In resoluteness, the present is not only brought back from being 
distracted by what is taken care of closest at hand, but is held in the 
future and having-been. We call the present that is held in authentic 
temporality, and is thus authentic, the Moment [Augenblick]. This 
term must be understood in the active sense as an ecstasy. It 
means the raptness [Entrückung] of Dasein that is held in 
resoluteness, a raptness in what is encountered as possibilities and 
circumstances to be taken care of in the situation. The 
phenomenon of the Moment can in principle not be clarified in 
terms of the now. . . . "in which" something comes into being, 
passes away, or is objectively present [vorhanden]. (338;323)   
What, then, is the ontological-temporal structure of the Moment in Heidegger and 
what is the ontological-temporal structure of Kierkegaard's Moment, and how 
does one compare/contrast with the other?    
In Heidegger, the Moment takes shape as a stepping out of or back from 
the preoccupation with the activities of the everyday (as taking care and concern 
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for beings in the world—Besorgen and Fürsorge) into the pure interplay between 
futurity and pastness (or the casting forward of understanding and the being-cast 
of mood). "Resolutely, Dasein has just taken itself back out of falling prey, in 
order to be that much more authentically in the "moment" (>>Augenblick<<) 
gazing at the situation >>there<<" (328; 313). The experience of the "moment" is 
one that opens up the elements of the "situation" through a "decision" or 
"resolution" (338; 313). But the decision holds the present in futurity and having-
been: it views the situation in the framework of time. The Augenblick is thus 
much more like the presentation of the absence of the present, the presentation 
or vision of the present's anticipatory and repetitive structure, than like the 
presentation of its presence. It is the "moment" of the unveiling of the temporality 
of existence rather than of its evasion through the immersion in any pure now.   
 How, then, does Kierkegaard's "moment" measure up against this 
"moment"? Are they, as it were, contemporaneous? And how accurate is 
Heidegger's critique of Kierkegaard's thinking of time? Restricting ourselves to 
the central elements of Kierkegaard's arguments, let us recall that the moment is 
explicitly not, in The Concept of Anxiety, the ever-disappearing present in time, or 
time as "infinite succession." Of the latter, Kierkegaard says explicitly that it flows 
immediately away and cannot constitute of itself a basis for temporality (85).  
Rather, only a certain "synthesis" of this fleeting instant with eternity constitutes 
temporality in its dimensionally differentiated sense. This "synthesis" articulates 
body with soul, or spirit (as substance), on the level of temporality, as the 
moment, except that, according to Kierkegaard, there is no third term in the 
"synthesis" of time with eternity: their "synthesis" must be understood as 
remaining in some sense unachieved, or tenuous at best: it is a "relation of time 
to eternity and . . . the reflection of eternity in time" (85). Since Kierkegaard 
argues that in the "passing by" that is time as infinite succession there is no 
"present" and therefore no past or future, on the one hand Heidegger does not 
do Kierkegaard justice by suggesting that Kierkegaard places the "moment" in 
"being-in-time." When Heidegger says, "Time as within-time-ness knows only the 
now but never a moment," it seems clear that Kierkegaard would agree with him.   
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On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that Kierkeggard "defines the 
moment with the help of the now and eternity." However, it remains to be seen in 
what respects such a definition is at odds with Heidegger's approach to the three 
ecstases of time, and in what respects it accords with that approach. Let us begin 
with the eternal. The eternal, for Kierkegaard, is "the present," as "an annulled 
succession," and "the present is full" (86). So in the contradiction constitutive of 
"the moment," emptiness confronts fullness, and passing-by confronts presence.  
Thus far, Kierkegaard certainly seems to ground temporality qua infinite 
succession in a supratemporal substance. And this aspect of his text cannot, I 
think, be denied.    
But it is not the only aspect. For example, when Kierkegaard says that 
time as infinite succession is "time past" (87), then he is delineating perhaps 
something like the "having-been-ness" or Gewesenheit that Heidegger envisions. 
The eternal, on the other hand, is associated with the future:  
the future in a certain sense signifies more than the present and the past, 
because in a certain sense the future is the whole of which the past is a 
part, and the future can in a certain sense signify the whole. This is 
because the eternal first signifies the future or because the future is the 
incognito in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with 
time, nevertheless preserves its association with time (89).10 
If the eternal is the future, which Heidegger conceives as the ekstasis of the 
"ahead of oneself [sich-vorweg]," while time is the past, which Heidegger 
characterizes as "already being in (the-world) [schon sein in (der-Welt-)]" and the 
moment is the "touch" or "intersection" of these two contradictory dimensions, 
which would correspond approximately to Heidegger's "being alongside of (the 
existents encountered within the world) [sein bei (innerweltlich begegnendem 
Seienden)]" (192; 185), a being-alongside-of that is anxiety itself because it is 
flooded with possibility, then Kierkegaard's temporality-concept comes to seem 
closer to Heidegger's existential analysis than it may have initially appeared.   
Of course, one should not efface the differences, and especially the 
substantial, spiritual, theological character of "the eternal" in Kierkegaard's 
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account, which provides the frame for a Christian anthropology of the moment, 
rather than a fundamental ontology. Yet while Kierkegaard does construct the 
present moment out of the "synthetic" tension between an eternal presence that 
is potentially up ahead and a process of time's empty now passing by, he does 
not, I think, simply situate the human being "in time," or construe the present 
moment in terms of the punctual Vorhandenheit of a subject, as Heidegger's 
critical remarks from 1941 suggest. While Kierkegaard does not leave behind 
some of the basic elements of a Christian ontotheological metaphysics, he does 
describe the human experience of temporality as constituted in the conflictual 
interplay of futurity and pastness, an interplay that generates a "moment" fraught 




In the attempt to evaluate some particularly important aspects of Heidegger's 
comments on, and relationship to, Kierkegaard's thought, I have argued thus far 
that while Kierkegaard's thought moves to some extent within the ontotheological 
metaphysics of presence and of human subjectivity to which Heidegger wishes to 
consign it, Kierkegaard also makes important gestures in ontological and 
temporal analysis that push away from this metaphysics. First, he displaces and 
unsettles the opposition between possibility and reality, essence and existence, 
providing Heidegger with new "possibilities" that he then "realizes" in new ways. 
And second, he provides an account of "the moment" as crossing between 
temporal and eternal that in some regards anticipates the Heideggerian account 
of the moment in terms of the three temporal ecstasies and in particular the 
partial withdrawal from "falling prey" to the entanglement with the presence of 
innerworldly beings. It remains for us to consider in a last turn of the argument: to 
what extent does Heidegger himself escape the metaphysics of presence and of 
the subject, and the onto-theology (conflation of Being with the highest being) 
that often goes hand in hand with these? I will restrict myself, concerning this 
extraordinarily complex theme, to two brief remarks.    
Konturen VII (2015) 209 
First, there remains, especially for the later Heidegger, the question of 
what Karl Löwith called Heidegger's "godless theology," i.e. the question of the 
extent to which the thinking of Being is separated from the theology of the 
highest being, and from the entanglement of the latter with various forms of the 
thought of the subject as absolutely present to itself.12 To anchor this enormous 
question here to just two passages: in the second Schelling lectures, Heidegger 
writes for example: "The word 'there,' the 'there,' means precisely this clearing for 
Being.  It is the essence of Dasein to be this 'there'. [Das Wort >>Da<< , das 
>>Da<< meint eben diese Lichtung für das Sein. Das Wesen des Daseins ist es, 
dieses >>Da<< zu sein]" (60)]. But if it is the essence of Dasein to be the clearing 
"for" Being, then Being is that for the sake of which Dasein exists, and having 
one's raison d'être in service to God (as God's subject) is not far off, even if it 
goes without saying here. And similarly, Heidegger says that Da-sein is called 
human only because "the human is assigned or allotted to Da-sein in order to 
become in Da-sein 'inständig'" [>>der<< Mensch dem Da-sein eigens 
zugewiesen wird, um im Da-sein inständig zu werden] (61), "inständig" meaning 
normally "urgent," as when one urgently implores someone for something, but 
here explicitly meaning standing and holding still in the clearing of the truth of 
Being. Through such formulations, Heidegger suggests that humanity has as its 
purpose to serve Being, which implies a theology of God or gods or fate, as the 
language of Seinsgeschick in the later work also suggests, as well as a 
subjection of the human subject to this divine instance.13  
Second remark: there remains the complex and often discussed question 
of Heideggerian resoluteness and the authenticity it is to realize. For 
resoluteness or decision is perhaps despite everything not so easy to distinguish 
from a sovereign subjectivity insisting on itself and on its proper identity, in this 
akin to Carl Schmitt's version of decisionism. The affinities of Heideggerian 
resoluteness with subjectivity appear, for example, in the sublime distance it 
takes, on the level of its own Being, from the entanglements of the everyday 
(even if it remains in fact actively involved with the world), and with the gathering 
of itself into the "moment." Indeed, the fact that Heidegger wants to exclude 
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anxiety from the "moment" of resoluteness as such is perhaps a symptom of this 
problem. Berthold-Bond discusses this question of the limits of Heideggerian 
resoluteness usefully, and finds support in many and varied recent readers.14    
In short, between the resoluteness so prominent in the earlier writings, 
and the clearing of Being that becomes more central in the later ones (neither of 
which emphases can do entirely without the other), a certain subjectivity and a 
certain ontotheology still haunt Heidegger's work. Of course, he himself is 
capable of acknowledging that he is only trying to break a pathway toward the 
thinking of Being. The point, therefore, is not to belittle Heidegger for not entirely 
escaping the limitations he attributes to Kierkegaard. Nor is it to claim that 
Kierkegaard goes farther than he does in breaking out of the subjectivist form of 
ontotheology that still guides his brilliant version of radical Protestant conviction. 
If Heidegger overstates the case both against Kierkegaard and on behalf of his 
own achievement, and if also his political delusions (from the twenties to the 
forties and beyond) register his continuing partial adherence to subjectivism and 
ontotheology beyond and against his strongest insights, nonetheless the 
continuation and critical renewal of his thinking of Dasein and of the truth of 
Being, under the powerful influence of Kierkegaard's singular intervention, remain 
valuable and even necessary today.15 
 This conversation remains of interest because we are living in an age—a 
post-Enlightenment, ambivalently secularized age—in which we are still caught 
between, on the one hand, a subjective truth or a subjectivity of truth made 
possible and necessary by the privatization of faith, i.e. by "tolerance," and on the 
other hand, a public discourse of rationality, scientific and/or philosophical, that 
would replace the objectivity of pre-Enlightenment discourses of revelation.  
Anxiety is in Kierkegaard and Heidegger a "subjective" and "existenziell" state, 
respectively, that functions as the threshold of a non-subjective absolute, divine 
and/or ontological, in the one case defined in more religious and particularist 
terms, in the other case in somewhat more secular and universalist ones. At a 
moment when the objective revelations are making a public come-back, and 
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religion is politicizing itself with a vengeance, maybe a return to their concerns 
with anxiety is not such a bad idea.  
 
                                                
1 Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus, 26. Citations from this work given 
below parenthetically in text. Translations my own.   
 
2 Sein und Zeit, 117; Being and Time, 114. Citations from this work given below 
parenthetically in text, first from German edition, then (after semicolon) from 
English translation. Consistent with Heidegger's claim about existence in the 
passage cited here is his indication elsewhere that "the they" or "the nobody" 
[das Man]—i.e. the answer to the question of the "who" of "everyday Dasein"—is 
not a "universal subject" (128; 124), because this would only be the case if the 
Being of "subjects" were understood in a manner incompatible with Dasein, 
namely as "factually objectively present cases of an existing genus [vorhandene 
Fälle einer vorkommenden Gattung]" (128; 125).   
 
3 For a rigorous overview of Heidegger's critical approach to subject-centered 
thinking, and one that usefully understands Heidegger to be thinking not "so 
much against the subject as that which comes before it," see Raffoul, Heidegger 
and the Subject (here, 3). For recent collections of essays that re-explore the 
question of the subject in post-Heideggerian terms from various perspectives, 
see Cadava et al, Who Comes After the Subject, and Critchley and Dews, 
Deconstructive Subjectivities.   
 
4 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totalité et infini, 262 (Totality and Infinity, 235).   
 
5 When he speaks of anxiety as "freedom . . . entangled . . .with itself" (49), and 
not with necessity, he is evidently articulating a space between freedom and 
necessity that, like (or as?) the space between possibility and reality, participates 
in each (since "entanglement" is a necessity of being bound up with).   
 
6 Cf. the discussion of the modalities of possibility and reality in the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript (282-307), where the ethical and aesthetic positions 
articulate the two perspectives from which one of these modalities predominates 
over the other (in the ethical, reality appearing as "higher" than possibility, in the 
aesthetic orientation the reverse). The reversibility of the hierarchical opposition, 
or its immanent self-deconstruction, functions at the very center of the articulation 
of the relation between the ethical and the aesthetic. For a theological discussion 
of this passage, see James Brown, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber, and Barth: 
Subject and Object in Modern Theology, 46ff.   
 
7 "The absolute future, holding the abyss of possibility in excess to all calculation 
or expectation, is the gap that separates the present from its own reality as 
posited. In this separation of the present from its own reality lies the origin of 
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anxiety. To possess oneself is impossible, and yet to flee oneself is equally 
impossible. One is bound over to oneself, and in being bound to oneself one is 
bound inexorably to what comes of itself, the absolute future" (191).   
 
8 One "crucial" difference is that in Heidegger authenticity and the ownmost—and 
ultimately resoluteness—orient the negotiation of a path through anxiety while in 
Kierkegaard seriousness and faith play this role. 
 
9 Cf. Lévinas' remarks in response to Jean Wahl's lecture on "A Short History of 
Existentialism," where Lévinas emphasizes that Heidegger displaces the notion 
of a "potentiality which passes into act" (52) by discovering in death the 
possibility of the realization of "the impossibility of all realization" (52), "the 
possible as such" thought independently of the act and its finality.   
 
10 Cf. Lévinas' displacement of this motif in his remarks, in "À propos de 
'Kierkegaard Vivant'" (Noms propres, 91; Proper Names, 78), on the "incognito" 
status that should be accorded to truth as the (persecuted) truth of the Other, 
beyond all revelation, who puts the ego in question by virtue of its implied infinite 
responsibility.    
 
11 Another dimension of Heidegger's critique of Kierkegaard's construal of the 
"moment" consists in Heidegger's (inconsistently maintained, but explicit) claim 
that anxiety is to be kept separate from the "moment," because the former 
"brings one into the mood for a possible resolution" (344; 328), but does not 
accomplish but only glimpse the possibility of repetition that, when realized, will 
constitute resolution itself (343; 327-8). Whereas Kierkegaard posits that "anxiety 
is the moment" (81), Heidegger places anxiety just on the threshold of the 
moment and its resolution, apparently because anxiety (as a mood) is too 
passive to constitute the more active stance of resoluteness per se. The tension 
and indeterminacy of the difference between possibility and actualization troubles 
here Heidegger's already problematic reservations with respect to the relative 
passivity and subjectivism of anxiety qua mood on the limit of decision.   
 
12 See Karl Löwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 214.   
 
13 Cf. Lévinas, in "Kierkegaard: Existence et éthique," where (as elsewhere) he 
defines the dimension of "hauteur" ("height") in terms of the "double mouvement 
de la responsabilité" ("double movement of responsibility") whereby "Celui dont 
j'ai à répondre, c'est celui à qui j'ai à répondre" ("The one to whom I am 
answerable is the same one for whom I am answerable") (Nom propres, 86; 
Proper Names, 74).   
 
14 See also the essays by Simon Critchley, Dominic Janicaud, Jean-Luc Marion, 
and Rudi Visker, in Critchley and Dews, Deconstructive Subjectivities, for 
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suggestive analyses of how we might think with and against Heidegger beyond 
the limits of his attempt to break free of metaphysical subjectivity.    
 
15 And of course, the Adornian, Lévinasian, Lacanian, and Derridian responses to 
Heidegger's thinking, for example, and to his reinscription of Kierkegaardian 
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